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Abstract
Web  applications  are  typically  developed  with  hard  
time constraints  and are often deployed with critical  
software bugs, making them vulnerable to attacks. The  
classification  and  knowledge  of  the  typical  software  
bugs that lead to security vulnerabilities is of utmost  
importance.  This  paper  presents  a  field  study 
analyzing 679 security patches of six widely used web  
applications. Results are compared against other field  
studies  on  general  software  faults  (i.e.,  faults  not  
specifically  related to  security),  showing that  only  a  
small  subset  of  software  fault  types  is  related  to  
security. Furthermore, the detailed analysis of the code  
of  the  patches  has  shown  that  web  application  
vulnerabilities  result  from  software  bugs  affecting  a 
restricted collection of statements. A detailed analysis  
of  the  conditions/locations  where  each  fault  was  
observed in our field study is presented allowing future 
definition of realistic fault models that cause security  
vulnerabilities  in  web applications,  which  is  the  key 
element to design a realistic attack injector.
1. Introduction
Most information systems and business applications 
that  are  built  nowadays  (e.g.  e-commerce,  banking, 
transportation, web mail, blogs, etc.) have a web front-
end. They need to be universally accessed by clients, 
employees  and  partners  around  the  world  as  online 
trading is becoming more and more ubiquitous in the 
global economy. These web applications, which can be 
used from anywhere, also become so widely exposed 
that  any  existing  security  vulnerability  will  most 
probably  be  uncovered  and  exploited  by  hackers. 
Hence,  the  security  of  web  applications  is  a  major 
concern and it  is  receiving more  and more attention 
from the research community. However, in spite of this 
growing  awareness  of  security  aspects  at  web 
application level [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], there is an increase in 
the  number  of  reported  attacks  that  exploit  web 
application vulnerabilities.  A recent  example (August 
17, 2007) of such attacks occurred in the recruitment 
website  Monster.com  where  1.6  million  of  personal 
records were stolen [6].  Numerous other  data breach 
attacks are frequently reported and many of them are 
due to security problems in web applications [7, 8, 9].
According to an Accunetix [10] audit result, 70% of 
the  3,200  websites  scanned  in  the  past  three  years 
contain  security  vulnerabilities.  The  NTA Monitor's 
2007  Annual  Security  Report  [11]  states  that  online 
risks in financial institutions have increased 16%, and 
28%  in  publishing  companies.  Overall,  32%  of  the 
websites  analyzed contain  critical  vulnerabilities  that 
are widely known and actively exploited by hackers. 
This  confirms  that  the  security  problem  in  web 
applications is an issue far from being solved.
Software  bugs  that  are  responsible  for  security 
vulnerabilities may have a devastating cost if exploited 
by hackers. Although configuration and human issues 
are  also  potential  causes  for  vulnerabilities,  the  root 
cause  of  most  security  attacks  are  vulnerabilities 
created by software faults.
In this paper we look at 679 security patches that 
were  developed  for  different  versions  of  six  widely 
used  web  applications.  In  order  to  characterize  the 
types of faults that are most likely to lead to software 
vulnerabilities we classify each patch code according 
to the Orthogonal Defect Classification (ODC) [12, 13, 
14]. This is important to better understand the potential 
relation between certain types of software defects and 
security vulnerabilities.  Every patch is also inspected 
in depth to gather the precise characteristics of the code 
that  was  responsible  for  the  security  problem.  This 
detailed patch information is of utmost importance for 
example to build a realistic attack injector. It may also 
be crucial for the development of automatic static code 
analyzers focusing on finding security vulnerabilities, 
the  specification  of  guidelines  for  teams  of  security 
code reviewers, the evaluation of penetration test tools 
as  well  as  for  the  creation  of  more  secure  internal 
policies for programming practices, among others.
For the purpose of this paper it is also important to 
understand if the distribution of security faults follows 
a similar pattern of software faults in general. Knowing 
the  different  distribution  patterns  can help  direct  the 
instruction of security teams, for example.  Therefore, 
we try to  correlate  our  results  with  a  field  study on 
common  software  faults  [14].  We  also  compare  our 
results  with  another  study  that  injected  common 
software  faults  into  web  applications  to  see  if  they 
caused  security  vulnerabilities  [15].  The  comparison 
with  both  field  studies  [14,  15]  is  important  to 
conclude if the injection of software faults can be used 
to accurately simulate security defects.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
presents  the  classification  of  software  faults  and 
discusses  the  source  data  (web  applications  and 
patches) used in the field study. Section 3 presents the 
results  of  the  field  study,  its  correlation  with  other 
studies  and the  vulnerability fault  models.  Section 4 
concludes the paper and suggests future work.
2. Classification of web application security 
patches
The  web  applications  whose  vulnerabilities  were 
used as case study represent a large slice of the web 
application  market  and  have  a  large  community  of 
users.  The classes of  vulnerabilities  analyzed have a 
critical  importance  and  affect  most  of  the  web 
applications, not just those used in this study.
The  present  study  uses  LAMP  (Linux,  Apache, 
Mysql  and  PHP)  web  applications  because  they 
include the technologies most commonly used to build 
web  applications  nowadays.  LAMP software  is  free, 
fast, flexible, and has many libraries. For these reasons, 
it is widely adopted to build custom web applications, 
portals  for  large  community  of  users,  e-commerce 
applications,  web  administration  tools,  etc. 
Nevertheless, this kind of setup is also responsible for 
a large number of reports of security flaws.
The  two  vulnerabilities  analyzed  by  the  present 
study are the most critical in web applications: Cross 
Site  Scripting  (XSS)  and SQL Injection  (see  [8]  for 
details  on  these  vulnerabilities).  Exploits  of  these 
vulnerabilities  take  advantage  of  unchecked  input 
fields  at  user  interface,  which  allows the  attacker  to 
change  the  SQL  commands  that  are  sent  to  the 
database server (SQL Injection) or through the input of 
HTML and a scripting language (XSS). 
The  Open  Web  Application  Security  Project 
(OWASP Foundation)  [8]  released  a  report  in  2007 
which  listed  the  ten  most  critical  web  application 
security  vulnerabilities.  It  was  based  on  data  on 
vulnerability  type  distributions  in  Common 
Vulnerabilities  and  Exposures  (CVE1)  provided  by 
Mitre Corporation [9]. According to this report, XSS is 
the  most  critical  vulnerability  (18.5%),  followed  by 
SQL injection (13.6%). Together they are responsible 
for  approximately one third of all  the CVE in 2006. 
The  popularity  of  these  attacks  is  related  to:  a)  the 
facility in finding and exploiting such vulnerabilities; 
b) the importance of the assets they can disclose; and 
c) the level of damage they may inflict. In fact, SQL 
injection  and  XSS  allow  attackers  to  access 
unauthorized data (read, insert, change or delete), gain 
access  to  privileged  database  accounts,  impersonate 
another user (such as the administrator), mimicry web 
applications, deface web pages, get access to the web 
server, etc.
When  application  vulnerabilities  are  discovered, 
software  developers  correct  the  problem  releasing 
application  updates  or  patches.  To  understand which 
code is responsible for security problems we based our 
study on patches correcting vulnerabilities.  With  this 
approach we are classifying the code that caused real 
security flaws.
For each web application tested, the methodology to 
classify the security patches is the following:
1) Verification of the patch to confirm if the version 
of the web application is available.
2) Analysis of the code with the vulnerability and of 
the code after being patched.
3) Classification of each code fix that is found in the 
patch. To be accurate, we followed some rules as 
described in section 2.4.
4) Loop through the previous steps until all available 
patches of the web application are analyzed.
2.1  Classification  of  software  faults  from the 
security vulnerability point of view
The  security  patch  code  analyzed  in  the  present 
study  was  categorized  based  on  the  software  faults 
classification proposed by  Chillarege et  al.  [12,  13]. 
They introduced the Orthogonal Defect Classification 
(ODC) that is typically used to classify software faults 
or  defects after  they have been fixed.  The ODC has 
been used to improve the software design process and 
it bridges the gap between statistical defect models and 
the  causal  analysis.  The  underlying  idea  is  that 
1 CVE is  a  widely accepted  list  of  publicly reported  web 
application  vulnerabilities.  It  is  hosted  by  MITRE 
Corporation
knowing the  root  cause of  software  defects  helps  in 
removing  their  source,  therefore  contributing  to  the 
improvement of software quality [16].  In  the present 
study we are only dealing with code defects, therefore 
we  only use  the  ODC defect  types  that  are  directly 
related  to  the  code.  These  defect  types  are  the 
following:  Assignment - errors in code initialization; 
Checking -  errors  in  program  logic  and  validation; 
Interface -  errors  interacting  among  components; 
Algorithm - need algorithm change without a design 
change.  Although  Function  and  Timing/Serialization 
are also related to the code we do not consider them 
because there  was  no  example  of  these  types  in  the 
field data.
The five classes of ODC fault types are too broad 
and they do not have enough detail for the precision 
needed by the present field study. We need to analyze 
the  code  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  software 
programmer, so each of the ODC types can be detailed 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  defect  [14]:  missing 
construct;  wrong  construct;  and  extraneous 
construct. With this extension the five classes of the 
ODC  are  detailed  into  62  fault  types  (see  [14]  for 
details). This refinement of the ODC is more focused 
on the concrete source of the software faults and has 
been used to support the fault model of the G-SWFIT 
tool for the emulation of software faults [14]. 
All  the  security  vulnerabilities  collected  can  be 
classified using only 11 fault types already identified in 
[14]  and one extra  fault  type (MFC extended).  They 
are presented in Table 1, where their correlation with 
the original ODC types is also shown. We defined the 
MFC  extended  fault  type  because  there  was  one 
situation that could not be classified according to the 
fault types defined by Durães [14]. The MFC extended 
is based on the missing function call (MFC) fault type. 
The MFC can only be used if the return value of the 
function is not used elsewhere in the code. However, in 
web application programming there are lots of security 
problems because of missing functions whose purpose 
is to sanitize a variable. The return of these functions is 
the variable sanitized that will be used in the code. This 
important  fault  type  can  not  be  classified  using  the 
original  MFC  so,  to  overcome  this  situation  we 
removed the restriction and created a new type named 
“MFC - Missing function call extended”.
2.2 Web applications analyzed
One mandatory condition for this field study is that 
we need to have access to the source code of the web 
applications  under  analysis.  The  code  of  previous 
versions and the associated security patches must also 
be  accessible.  The  other  mandatory  condition  is  the 
availability of information correlating the security fix 
and the specific version of the web application.
For  the  present  study  we  have  selected  six  web 
applications: PHP-Nuke [17], Drupal [18], PHP-Fusion 
[19],  WordPress [20],  phpMyAdmin [21] and phpBB 
[22].  These  are  representative  open  source  web 
applications  and,  fortunately,  it  is  possible  to  find 
enough information available about them.
Drupal,  PHP-Fusion and phpBB are Web Content 
Management Systems (CMS). A CMS is an application 
that allows an individual or a community of users to 
easily create and administrate web sites that publish a 
variety  of  contents.  The  created  sites  can  go  from 
personal  web  pages  and  community  portals  to 
corporate  and  e-commerce  applications.  Drupal  won 
first place at the 2007 Open Source CMS Award [23]. 
PHP-Fusion was one of the five award overall winner 
finalists at the 2007 Open Source CMS Award [23] and 
has a large community of users working with it. In fact, 
a Google search of PHP-Fusion pages using the text 
Fault type Description ODC type
MFC Missing function call Algorithm
MFC extended Missing function call extended Algorithm
MVIV Missing variable initialization using a value Assignment
MIA Missing if construct around statements Checking
MIFS Missing if construct plus statements Algorithm
MLAC Missing "AND EXPR" in expression used as branch condition Checking
MLOC Missing "OR EXPR" in expression used as branch condition Checking
WVAV Wrong value assigned to variable Assignment
WPFV Wrong variable used in parameter of function call Interface
WFCS Wrong function called with same parameters Algorithm
ELOC Extraneous "OR EXPR" in expression used as branch condition Checking
EFC Extraneous function call Algorithm
Table 1. The 12 detected fault types observed in the field, their description and corresponding ODC fault type
"Powered by PHP-Fusion" finds over 2 million pages. 
Finally, phpBB is the most widely used Open Source 
forum solution.  phpBB was  the  winner  of  the  2007 
Sourceforge  Community  Choice  Awards  for  Best 
Project for Communications [24].
PHP-Nuke  is  a  well  known  web  based  news 
automation system built  as  a  community portal.  The 
news  can  be  submitted  by  registered  users  and 
commented  by  the  community.  PHP-Nuke  is  quite 
modular and custom modules can be added to increase 
the number of features available. PHP-Nuke is one of 
the most well known CMS and it has been downloaded 
from the official site over 8 million times [17].
WordPress  is  a  personal  blog publishing  platform 
that also supports the creation of easy to administrate 
web sites. A Google search of WordPress pages using 
the text "Proudly powered by WordPress", which is at 
the  bottom  of  WordPress  based  sites,  finds  over  7 
million pages.
phpMyAdmin  is  a  web  based  MySQL 
administration tool. It is one of the most popular PHP 
applications and has a very large community of users. 
phpMyAdmin is available in 47 languages, is included 
in many Linux distributions and was the winner of the 
2007 Sourceforge Community Choice Awards for Best 
Tool or Utility for SysAdmins [24].
The web applications analyzed are so broadly used 
that  they  have  a  large  number  of  vulnerabilities 
disclosed from previous versions, which are the subject 
of analysis of the present field study (see Table 2). The 
number of vulnerabilities  is  not constant among web 
applications  because  the quality of  the code and the 
number  of  vulnerabilities  publicly disclosed  varies  a 
great deal.
It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  all  discovered 
vulnerabilities open a door for hackers to successfully 
attack any one of the millions of web sites developed 
with  a  given  version  of  the  web  application. 
Furthermore, it is common to find a vulnerability in a 
specific version of a web application that also affects a 
large  number  of  the  previous  versions  of  the  same 
application.  The  overall  situation  is  even  worse 
because web site administrators do not always update 
the software of the site in due time when new patches 
and releases are available.  This can be confirmed by 
the results of the security analyst David Kierznowski 
that  preformed  a  survey  showing  that  49  out  of  50 
WordPress blogs checked did not upgrade to the last 
stable version and were running software with known 
vulnerabilities [25].
2.3 Obtaining the patch code
The availability to the public of the past collection 
of  vulnerability  patches  is  closely  related  to  the 
policies the developers have about sharing information 
about  older  versions,  especially  those  with  security 
problems.  Furthermore,  most  of  the  security 
announcements  available  are  so  vague  that  it  is 
impossible to know what source files and variables are 
affected. Moreover, some of the information disclosed 
groups together other types of security vulnerabilities 
which  are  not  the  target  of  the  present  paper  (e.g. 
directory  traversal,  remote  file  inclusion,  cookie 
poisoning).
  In  order  to  gather  the  actual  code  of  security 
patches several sources of data had to be used, such as 
mirror  web  sites,  other  sites  with  the  source  code, 
online  reviews,  news  sites,  sites  related  to  security, 
hacker  sites,  changelog  files  of  the  application,  the 
version control system repository, etc.
For  the  purpose  of  this  study,  we  just  need  the 
changes made to the code of the application correcting 
the vulnerability problem. There is no standard way of 
providing the data about  a  security vulnerability fix; 
therefore,  the  variety  of  resources  of  information 
provides different presentations of the collected data. 
This makes it  harder to perform the analysis because 
Web 
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Versions analyzed # Vuln.
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4.5.5, 4.5.6, 4.6.5, 4.6.6, 




6.00.106, 6.00.108, 6.00.110, 
6.00.204,  6.00.206, 
6.00.207, 6.00.303, 6.00.304, 
6.01.4, 6.01.5, 6.01.6, 6.01.7, 




1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.5.2-1, 2.0, 
2.0.10-RC2,2.0.4, 2.0.5, 




2.1.10, 2.4.0, 2.5.2,  2.5.6, 
2.5.7PL1, 2.6.3PL1, 2.6.4, 
2.6.4PL4, 2.7.0PL2, 2.8.2.4, 
2.9.0, 2.9.1.1, 2.10.0.2, 




2.0.3, 2.0.5, 2.0.6, 2.0.6c, 
2.0.7, 2.0.8, 2.0.9, 2.0.10, 
2.0.16, 2.0.17
61
Total vulnerabilities analyzed 679
Table 2. Versions of the web application used and 
number of vulnerabilities analyzed
the information about the fix code has to be obtained 
from several sources. The four main source types used 
in the current paper are described next:
1) Security patch files available with information 
about the target version of the application. This 
patch file was written to substitute just the original 
application file with the vulnerability leaving all 
the  other  source  files  intact.  To  obtain  the  code 
changes of these two files we used the UNIX diff 
command.
2) Updated  version  of  the  web  application. 
Actually, this is a completely new version of the 
application containing all the new features and bug 
fixes  (including security ones).  This  is  the  most 
common source of  information but it  is  also the 
one that needs more work to be done. We have to 
find,  amongst  all  the  other  source  files  of  the 
application,  the  code responsible  for  the  various 
security vulnerabilities addressed by this version. 
Additional  information  is  needed  about  what 
source files  have been updated with the security 
fixes. This information is commonly found in the 
changelog  file  that  is  distributed  with  the 
application.  This  changelog  file  consists  of  the 
summary  of  the  changes  made  in  the  several 
versions  of  the  application,  including what  bugs 
and security issues  were fixed.  After  identifying 
the vulnerable source file we had to use the UNIX 
diff command to obtain the code changes between 
this  file  and  the  corresponding  file  from  the 
vulnerable  version  of  the  application  (usually  is 
the previous version).
3) Available  security  diff  files.  This  is  a  file 
containing only the code changes needed to fix a 
referenced vulnerability. The contents are ready to 
be  applied  to  the  target  application  using  the 
UNIX patch command. This is all the information 
we  need  and,  although  this  is  the  easiest  data 
source to work with, it is the rarest to find.
4) The version control  system repository. Almost 
all open source applications are developed using a 
version  control  system  to  administer  the 
contributions  of  the  large  community  of 
developers from around the world.  With  granted 
permissions to query the repository of the version 
control system we have access to all the revisions 
(similar  to  versions)  of  the  application  and 
corresponding  changelog  files.  By  querying  the 
changelog we can obtain the information about the 
revisions  of  the  application  where  the  security 
vulnerability  problems  were  fixed.  It  is  then 
possible to obtain the security diff file using the 
version control system.
2.4 Patch code analysis guidelines
The  patch  code  is  analyzed  according  to  the 
extension of the ODC classification, emphasizing the 
nature of the patch as missing, wrong, or extraneous 
code. Because of the different coding practices of the 
target applications some decisions need to be clarified. 
To avoid classification mistakes and for the coherent 
analysis of the fix code some generic guidelines were 
defined:
1) When  the  patch  can  fix  both  XSS  and  SQL 
Injection the corresponding fault type is accounted 
for both security vulnerabilities. For example, this 
occurs when a variable not  properly sanitized is 
used in a query (allowing SQL injection) and, later 
on  is  displayed  on  the  screen  (allowing  XSS). 
When  this  variable  is  properly  sanitized  both 
vulnerabilities will be mitigated simultaneously.
2) It  is  assumed  that  the  information  publicly 
disclosed in specialized sites is accurate and that 
the fix made by the programmer of the patch and 
made available by the company that develops the 
web application solves the stated problem.
3) To  correct  a  single  vulnerability  several  code 
changes may be necessary. All the changes will be 
considered as a series of singular fault type fixes. 
For example,  when two functions  are needed to 
properly sanitize a variable. Missing any of these 
functions  makes  the  application  vulnerable,  so 
both of them must be taken into account.
4) When  a  particular  code  change  corrects 
immediately  several  vulnerabilities,  each  one  is 
considered as a singular fix. For example, suppose 
that: the value assigned to a specific variable may 
come from two sources of external inputs; and the 
variable  is  only  displayed  in  one  place  without 
ever  being  sanitized.  We  consider  that  the 
application  has  two  security  vulnerabilities 
because  it  can  be  attacked  from  two  different 
inputs. However to correct the problem all that is 
needed is sanitizing the variable just  before it  is 
displayed.  In  this  example  we consider  that  two 
security problems have been fixed, although only 
one change of code was needed.
5) A  security  vulnerability  may  affect  several 
versions of the application. This happens when the 
code has not been changed for a long time, but it is 
vulnerable.  The  patch  to  fix  the  problem is  the 
same  for  all  of  the  versions,  and  therefore  it  is 
considered only one fix.
By following the previous guidelines it is possible to 
classify almost all the code fixes. However in some 
situations, patching one or more vulnerabilities in-
volved so many changes that the creation of new func-
tions or a change in the structure of the overall piece of 
code was impossible to classify. This situation is usu-
ally associated with major code changes involving sim-
ultaneously security and other bug fixes. These occur-
rences are quite marginal (5.4%) and were not con-
sidered in our study because they are complex and dif-
ficult to analyze due to the lack of information avail-
able. 
3. Results and discussion.
We  have  classified  679  XSS  and  SQL injection 
security fixes found in six web applications. Figure 1 
shows  the  overall  distribution  of  XSS  and  SQL 
injection  vulnerabilities  found  in  all  the  web 
applications analyzed. As can be seen, XSS is the most 
frequent type by far.  This trend is also confirmed by 
vulnerability reports disclosed in CVE [8, 9]. One of 
the factors that contribute to the prevalence of XSS is 
that  every  input  variable  of  the  application  is  a 
potential attack entry point, which is not the case for 
SQL injection.  The  explanation  resides  in  the  high 
number of variables found that needed to be sanitized.
 The  distribution  of  the  occurrences  of  XSS  and 
SQL injection throughout the twelve classification fault 
types  is  shown in  Figure 2.  The  most  representative 
and widespread fault type is the MFC extended. This is 
the most common fault type, representing 72.90% of 
all the fault types found. The high value observed for 
this fault type comes from the massive use of specific 
functions to validate and clean data that  comes from 
the  outside  of  the  application  (user  inputs,  database 
records, files, etc.). In many cases, functions are also 
used to cast  a variable to a  numeric value,  therefore 
preventing string injection in this variable. 
The  next  three  most  common  fault  types  are  the 
WPFV, MIFS and WVAV. These vulnerabilities usually 
arise from the following main situations:
1) Missing  “’”  around  a  PHP  variable  in  SQL 
queries  allowing  an  attacker  to  inject  a  custom 
query (SQL injection).
2) Missing “if” around a statement. When a variable 
is  not  null  it  needs  to  be  sanitized,  otherwise  a 
malicious code may be injected from the outside. 
This  is  an  exploit  of  the  PHP  directive 
“register_globals  =  on”  [26]  which  allows  the 







Figure 1. XSS and SQL injection distribution
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Figure 2. Vulnerability fault types summary
A poor  regex  string 2 used  to  filter  the  user  input. 
Looking at several versions of the same program 
we frequently found the same regex string being 
updated as new attacks were discovered.
Excluding the faults types already discussed (MFC 
extended,  WPFV,  MIFS  and  WVAV),  the  remaning 
fault types correspond just to 11.49% of the security 
vulnerabilities.  These  fault  types  are  EFC,  WFCS, 
MVIV, MLAC, MFC, MIA, MLOC and ELOC.
Table 3 shows the individual results for each fault 
type found in all web application. All the fault types 
contribute  to  XSS,  but  only eight  to  SQL injection. 
Although it is relevant to know what fault types may 
generate vulnerabilities, the four fault types that do not 
contribute to SQL injection (MFC, MIA, MLOC and 
ELOC) only account for 2.21% of all the fault types. 
A common belief  is  that  vulnerabilities  related to 
input  validation  are  mainly  due  to  missing  IF 
constructs  or  even  missing  conditions  in  the  IF 
construct. However, our field study shows that this is 
not  the case,  as  the overall  MISSING IF fault  types 
(MIFS and MIA: see table 1) have a weight of 6.04%. 
As for the MISSING CONDITION fault types (MLAC 
and  MLOC),  they  only represent  1.77%.  We indeed 
verified that programmers do not use IF constructs to 
validate the input data, because of the usual complexity 
of  the  validation  procedure  to  avoid  XSS  and  SQL 
injection. The typical approach is to use a function to 
clean (filter) the input data and let it go through, and 
not to stop the program and raise an exception.
2 A regex string describes a search pattern, according to 
specific syntax rules, that is used to search into another 
string.
3.1  Comparing  security  faults  with  generic 
software faults
 The  original  ODC  classification  is  broadly  used 
and accepted as quite adequate for the classification of 
software faults. Durães [14] analyzed 668 faults from a 
collection of 12 representative open source C programs 
using the  ODC, while  Christmansson  and Chillarege 
[12]  studied  large  databases  and  operating  systems. 
Each of these studies uses a different application and 
programming  technology.  Thus,  it  is  relevant  to 
compare our results with other field studies like [14] 
and [12], as shown in Table 4. 
Although the values of the current field study are 
quite different from those of the two other studies [12, 
14], the Algorithm has the highest value followed by 
the Assignment. The overall distribution in table 4 is 
quite different and reinforces the idea that the kind of 
mistakes  leading  to  security  vulnerabilities  has  a 
different  distribution  from  the  generic  fault  types. 
There is an increasing importance of some fault types 
in  detriment of  others  when we want  to analyze  the 
Web 
applications
PHP-Nuke Drupal PHP-Fusion WordPress phpMyAdmin phpBB
Fault type SQL XSS SQL XSS SQL XSS SQL XSS SQL XSS SQL XSS
MFC extended 115 135 4 36 6 15 8 82 1 57 5 31
WPFV 29 4 4 1
MIFS 5 2 2 8 6 1 12 2
WVAV 4 3 6 1 16
EFC 1 19 1
WFCS 3 1 1 1 14
MVIV 1 1 1 4 4





Total Faults 153 139 4 59 20 29 9 101 1 103 6 55
Table 3. Detailed results
ODC defect 
type





Assignment 41 6.04% 21.4% 21.98%
Checking 16 2.36% 25% 17.48%
Interface 38 5.60% 7.3% 8.17%
Algorithm 584 86.01% 40.1% 43.41%
Function 0 0% 6.1% 8.74%
Table 4. ODC vulnerabilities
security of web applications. 
Based on the fact that some common vulnerabilities 
found  are  caused  by  specific  characteristics  of  the 
programming language (like the use of default value of 
the  “register_globals”  directive,  in  PHP),  we believe 
that  the  type  of  language/technologies  involved  will 
influence the distribution of faults over the ODC types 
when we are analyzing  security faults.  Programming 
languages, in general, have a great concern in security 
and this can be seen in the new features that are being 
implemented in recent versions. Some of these changes 
imply an adjustment in the way some operations are 
performed by the programmer and this will  certainly 
reflect more the results of the ODC analysis than the 
case of common faults.
Another important  conclusion can also be derived 
by comparing our results with those presented by the 
study  in  [15].  In  this  study  the  authors  propose  a 
method  to  benchmark  web  application  vulnerability 
scanners by injecting generic software faults. Although 
the purpose of the paper was to test fuzzers, the results 
also show what common fault types may produce XSS 
and SQL injection vulnerabilities. Analyzing the results 
presented in [15] we find that they could inject both 
vulnerabilities with one fault type that was not detected 
during our study. This fault type is “WLEC - Wrong 
logical  expression  used  as  branch  condition”,  which 
generated  16.10%  of  the  total  number  of  faults 
injected.  This  result  means  that  not  all  the  possible 
fault types that can generate vulnerabilities are actually 
responsible  for  the  security  problem  of  web 
applications found in the real world.
3.2 Detailed vulnerability analysis 
During  the  classification  of  the  web  application 
vulnerabilities we discovered some repeating patterns 
in  the  code.  The  instructions  that  fixed  the 
vulnerabilities belong to a restricted subset of all  the 
possible  code structures of  each fault  type.  To make 





Missing casting to numeric of one variable to 
itself
B
Missing  assignment  of  one  variable  to  a 
function processing that same variable
C
Missing casting to numeric of one variable to 
another variable
D
Missing  assignment  of  one  variable  to  a 
function processing another variable
WPFV
A
Add “’” to variables inside a string argument 
of a SQL query
B
Changing  the  regex  string  of  a  function 
argument
C
Changing  the  sub-string  of  a  function 
argument
D
Changing the PHP superglobal variable when 
it is an argument of a function
MIFS
A
Missing  traditional  “if…then…else” 
condition
B




Insertion  of  a  new pattern  in  a  regex string 
assigned to a variable
B
Changing  one  value  of  an  array  or  a 
concatenation  of  a  new  substring  inside  a 
string
C
Changing the PHP superglobal variable when 
assigned to a variable
D
Adding “’” to  variables inside a  string in  a 
SQL Query assignment
E Destroying the variable
F
Removing the concatenation operator “.” in an 
assignment
G
Replacing  an  array  variable  with  a  scalar 
variable
Table 5. fault types and corresponding sub-types 
Fault types
& sub-types SQL (%) XSS (%) SQL+XSS (%)
MFC - extended
A 61.66 29.42 38.59
B 7.25 35.39 27.39
C 2.07 5.56 4.57
D 1.04 2.88 2.36
WPFV
A 15.03 0.00 4.27
B 1.04 1.03 1.03
C 0.00 1.03 0.74
D 0.00 0.62 0.44
MIFS
A 5.18 4.73 4.86
B 1.55 0.41 0.74
WVAV
A 0.00 2.88 2.06
B 0.00 1.23 0.88
C 1.04 0.41 0.59
D 1.04 0.00 0.29
E 0.00 0.41 0.29
F 0.00 0.21 0.15
G 0.52 0.00 0.15
EFC 0.52 4.12 3.09
WFCS 1.04 3.70 2.95
MVIV 0.52 2.06 1.62
MLAC 1.55 1.65 1.62
MFC 0.00 2.06 1.47
MIA 0.00 0.62 0.44
MLOC 0.00 0.21 0.15
ELOC 0.00 0.21 0.15
Table 6. Occurrence of fault types and sub-types
found we defined sub-types for the four most common 
fault types (MFC extended, WPFV, MIFS and WVAV), 
as described in Table 5.
The occurrence of the fault types and the sub-types 
detected  in  the  vulnerabilities  analyzed  is  shown  in 
Table 6. We can observe that there are some sub-types 
responsible  for  a  large  slice  of  the  all  the 
vulnerabilities.  The  two  types  with  higher  values 
belong to the MFC – extended fault sub-types A and B 
and  together  they  account  for  65.98%  of  all  the 
vulnerabilities  found.  We  can  also  find  important 
differences between the values of the sub-types relating 
to  XSS  and  SQL  injection.  For  example,  MFC  – 
extended A is much more importance in SQL injection, 
but MFC – extended B is the opposite. Also WPFV A 
has a huge importance in SQL injection and was not 
found any in XSS.
In  the  following  paragraphs  we  analyze  in  detail 
each  fault  type  discussing  the  conditions/locations 
where each fault was observed in our field study. This 
discussion  provides  useful  insights  to  support  the 
future definition of realistic vulnerability fault models, 
which are essential to allow the development of realist 
attack injectors. Such kind of tools (which currently do 
not exist yet) can be potential very useful to simulate 
attacks  by  injecting  realistic  vulnerabilities,  as  help 
validating  intrusion  detection  systems  and  other 
security mechanisms.
Missing function call extended (MFC extended). 
This fault type is typically observed in situations where 
the patch code consists of a missing function returning 
a value that will  be used in the code. One important 
point  is  the  fact  that  this  defect  does  not  cause  any 
compiling or executing errors. The missing function is 
always  related to  the  filtering one of  the  arguments. 
Whenever  it  has  more  than  one  argument  the  other 
arguments are the configuration of the filtering.
We define four sub-types in which the functions that 
change the variable type to numeric are differentiated 
from the other functions. This is done because there is 
a common exploitation of numeric variables that also 
allow string values.
Following are the constraints of the sub-types:
A. Missing casting to numeric of  one variable  to 
itself using the  “(int)” type  cast  or  using the 
“intval()”  PHP  function.  It  can  also  be 
considered  as  being  the  same  variable  “$var” 
situations like those using the “$_GET[$var]”. 
This was found when the patch added the entire 
assignment line, for example: 
“$var=(int)$_GET[$var];”




B. Missing  assignment  of  one  variable  to  a 
function  processing  that  same  variable. This 
was also found when replacing a variable that was 
part  of  a  string  concatenation  with  a  function 
processing that same variable. The functions can 
also  act  as  arguments  of  other  functions.  For 
example,  when  the  patch  added  the  function 
“func2()”:
“$var1 = func2(func1(($var1));”
C. Missing casting to numeric of  one variable  to 
another variable using the “(int)” type cast or 
using the “intval()” PHP function.  This was 
found when the patch added the entire assignment 
line, for example: 
“$var1=(int)$_GET[$var2];”




D. Missing  assignment  of  one  variable  to  a 
function processing another variable.  This was 
also found when replacing a variable that was part 
of  a  string  concatenation  with  a  function 
processing another variable. The functions can act 
as  arguments  of  other  functions.  For  example, 
when the patch added the function “func2()”:
“$var1 = func2(func1(($var2));”
Wrong  variable  used  in  parameter of  function 
call  (WPFV). This  is  typically  found  when  the 
following  changes  occurred  in  the  argument  of  a 
function:
A. Adding  “’”  to  variables  inside  a  string 





B. Changing  the  regex  string  of  a  function 
argument. When the patch code is a change in the 
regex string of a function argument. This function 
can be a custom made function that  processes a 
regex  string  or  one  of  the  PHP  functions 
“preg_replace” and “preg_match”.  In  the 
analyzed code the regex string was used to check a 
variable closely related to an input value, looking 
for known suspicious strings that were part of an 
attack.
C. Changing  the  sub-string  of  a  function 
argument. When the argument of the function is 
the result  of the concatenation of several  strings 
and  variables  and  the  patch  code  removed  or 
changed one of them.
D. Changing the PHP superglobal variable when it 
is an argument of a function. When the argument 
of  the  function  contains  the  PHP  superglobal 




Missing if construct plus statements (MIFS). This 
fault type was found only when an IF condition and 
just one or two surrounding statements were missing.
A. Missing traditional  “if…then…else” condition. 
When  it  is  a  traditional  “if…then…else” 
condition, an “elsif” or an “else”
B. Missing “if…then…else” condition in compact 
form. This  fault  type  was  also  found  when  the 
condition is in the compact form, for example:
“(($var != '') ? 'true' : 
'false')”
Wrong value assigned to variable (WVAV). This 
is  typically  found  when  the  following  situations 
changed the variable assignment:
A. Insertion  of  a  new  pattern  in  a  regex  string 
assigned to a variable. In the analyzed code the 
regex string was used to check a variable closely 
derived from an input  value,  looking for known 
XSS attacks.
B. Missing or extraneous value in an array or a 
concatenation  of  a  new  substring  inside  a 
string.
C. Changing the PHP superglobal  variable  when 
assigned  to  a  variable. When  the  variable  is 
assigned  to  a  PHP  superglobal  variable 
“$_SERVER” and it is changed. For example:
 Replace “$var1=$_SERVER[$var2];” with 
“$var1=$_SERVER[$var3];”
D. Adding  “'”  to  variables  inside  a  string  in  a 
SQL query assignment. For example:
Replace: “SELECT…FROM…WHERE id=$var” 
with
“SELECT…FROM…WHERE id='$var'”
E. Destroying the variable. For example:
“unset($var);”
F. Removing the concatenation operator “.” in an 
assignment. For example:
Replacing “$var .= …” with “$var = …”
G. Replacing  an  array  variable  with  a  scalar 
variable. For example:
Replacing “$var=$members[$i];” with 
“$var=$memberval;”
Extraneous function call  (EFC). When this  fault 
type  was  found the extraneous function returned the 
same data type of the argument. This was found when 
the function was replaced with a  variable which has 
already been sanitized. Another situation found was the 
removal of  a  function when there is  a  function of  a 
function.
Wrong  function  called  with  same  parameters 
(WFCS). When this fault type was found the function 
was  replaced  by another  function  while  keeping  the 
same arguments,  even when the function is  the only 
statement  in  the line.  In  all  these situations  the new 
function was a custom made function that was already 
in the code or it  was implemented in the patch. The 
new  function  was  always  related  to  filtering  the 
argument.
Missing  "AND  EXPR"  in  expression  used  as 
branch condition (MLAC). When this fault type was 
found there was a missing AND expression inside an 
IF condition.
Missing  variable  initialization  using  a  value 
(MVIV). In PHP there is no need to declare a variable 
and the  variable  stays  uninitialized  (with  the  default 
value)  until  the  first  assignment.  Variables  have  a 
default value of their type (false, zero, empty string or 
an empty array). This fault type was found when there 
was  a  missing  first  assignment  of  a  variable  to  an 
empty string, or an empty array.
Missing function call (MFC). This fault type was 
observed  in  the  situations  where  the  patch  code 
consists of a missing function being the only statement 
in  its  line  of  code.  The  function  did  not  return  any 
value and, therefore it was not assigned to any variable. 
The missing function was always custom made and its 
implementation was most of the times created by the 
patch.
Missing  if  construct  around  statements  (MIA). 
This fault type was found only when an IF condition 
was  missing,  surrounding only one  statement  that  is 
already there in the code. 
Missing  "OR  EXPR"  in  expression  used  as 
branch condition (MLOC). This fault type was found 
when there was a missing OR expression inside an IF 
condition.
Extraneous "OR EXPR" in expression used as 
branch  condition  (ELOC). This  fault  type  was 
considered  when  there  was  an  extraneous  OR 
expression inside an IF condition.
4. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the vulnerabilities  of six web 
applications using their past 679 security fixes as the 
field data. Results show that only a small subset of 12 
generic  software  faults  is  responsible  for  all  the 
security problems (XSS and SQL injection). We found 
considerable differences by comparing the distribution 
of the fault types of our results with studies of common 
software  faults.  We  also  detected  that  one  of  the 
Missing Function Call fault types (MFC extended) is 
responsible  for  73%  of  all  the  security  problems 
analyzed.  The  fault  types  are  thoroughly  detailed 
providing  enough  information  for  the  definition  of 
vulnerability  fault  models  that  can  be  used  by 
researchers of realistic attack injectors. 
For future work we propose other studies searching 
for  patterns  in  the  code  responsible  for  security 
problems.  These  studies  could  follow  the  same 
methodology  presented  here  but  aimed  at 
vulnerabilities  in  operating  systems  and  their 
applications.
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